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How private credit evaluates a borrower
A senior lender reads for the downside, not the upside. Here is the ten-axis framework the credit committee actually applies, and the math that turns the read into a term sheet.
Private credit underwrites the downside, not the upside: a credit committee builds a trailing EBITDA baseline, sets a leverage multiple, and stress-tests fixed-charge coverage against scenarios drawn from its own portfolio history. The same ten-axis framework a private equity buyer uses applies, but weighted differently: stress tolerance and customer concentration carry more weight, because the lender does not own the equity upside that would otherwise absorb the risk.
The reviewer's mental model
A senior lender is not trying to predict how a business will grow. The lender is trying to predict, with conviction, that the business will service its debt under conditions worse than today. That is a different exercise from an equity underwrite: the equity buyer reads to the upside case and discounts it, and the lender reads to the downside case and insists on cushion.
The pricing, the covenant package, the amortization schedule and the reps and warranties are a structural expression of how much cushion the lender requires, given what the credit memo concluded about the business.
In the first hour with the materials, the credit team is testing whether the trailing financial picture is internally coherent, whether cash flow available for debt service is stable enough to model, and which kind of credit memo this becomes: the clean one that clears committee at the quoted spread, the structured one that comes back with tighter covenants, or the one the team declines. In the first week, the team builds the downside case: it stresses trailing EBITDA for the specific pressures its own portfolio history says are most likely, a customer concentration event, a margin compression cycle, a working-capital absorption, a key-person transition, a covenant default at a prior credit, and calculates how many months of headroom the borrower would have at each covenant level before a technical default.
By the time the term sheet is drafted, the lender has a private model of the business that focuses sharply on cash flow, leverage capacity and the specific failure modes the credit team has seen before. That model is built around the same ten-axis framework a sophisticated equity reviewer would apply, but the weights are different, and two axes carry far more influence than the other eight.
The ten things a reviewer reads to, weighted for a lender
The same ten axes a sophisticated private equity buyer applies show up in a senior lender's read of a business, but the weights shift. Two axes gate the read outright. The other eight calibrate it, and for a lender the calibrating weights move toward the axes that predict cash-flow stability and covenant capacity, and away from the axes that predict equity-side upside.
| Axis | How a lender reads it |
|---|---|
| Financial consistency (gating) | The trailing baseline the downside case rests on. If it does not reconcile across the tax returns, bank statements and ledgers, the memo cannot set a number the committee trusts. |
| Data integrity (gating) | A lender books against figures it can trace to source documents. Inputs that cannot be verified become a precondition to close, not a priced risk. |
| Stress tolerance | The axis that moves the most relative to an equity read. It sets the covenant package, because the lender is reading for how the business performs when conditions turn worse. |
| KPI completeness | Read through a cash-flow lens: working capital, receivables aging and customer-level revenue stability, not growth or engagement metrics. |
| Reporting maturity | How quickly a closed monthly book arrives. It decides whether covenant compliance is administratively light or heavy for the life of the loan. |
| Customer concentration | Read as a tail-risk event that could trip a covenant, not as a discount on value. |
| Key-person dependency | Read for operational continuity: whether the business still services the loan if the one or two people who run it leave. |
| Operational risk | Read for the catastrophic case only. Ordinary variance is already absorbed by the covenant cushion. |
| Management responsiveness | A preview of the covenant-compliance relationship. Slow or evasive answers during underwriting tend to reappear during the first compliance cycle. |
| Governance | Read for the discipline around decisions that touch credit: distributions, capital expenditure, acquisitions, changes to the operating plan. |
- KPI completeness, read through a cash-flow lens, means working-capital metrics, customer-level revenue stability, days-sales-outstanding and aging analysis, inventory turns where applicable, customer churn or revenue retention, and gross-margin stability by segment.
- Reporting maturity means whether the business can close a reliable month within thirty to forty-five days of period end, since most credit agreements set delivery requirements on that cadence.
- Operational risk is read for the catastrophic case only: a supply-chain single point of failure, a regulatory exposure that could halt operations, litigation that could consume cash, or an insurance gap, not ordinary variance. Operational risks that surface late in the credit process tend to reopen the term sheet, which is why naming them early matters more than the finding itself.
Supports a lighter covenant package
- Stress tolerance evidenced by historical operating responses to past downturns, or a documented contingency plan.
- Customer concentration with multi-year contracts, switching costs and a documented diversification trajectory.
- A monthly close that already clears inside the credit agreement's delivery window.
Tightens covenants or lowers leverage
- No historical evidence the business has ever been stressed, which removes the lender's basis for assuming it would hold up.
- Concentration with no switching costs or contract protection, which the lender stresses as a departure scenario.
- A close cadence slower than the credit agreement's delivery window, structured as a monitoring condition or priced as a covenant of its own.
By the time the term sheet is drafted, the lender holds a private model of the business built around that weighting, with far more emphasis on stress tolerance and cash-flow capacity than an equity reviewer would apply.
The math the credit memo runs
A senior credit memo is built around three numbers, and how they relate is the most useful mechanical knowledge a borrower can carry into a process.
Trailing EBITDA baseline
Twelve months of EBITDA, adjusted for items the lender accepts as one-time, non-recurring or owner-discretionary. The lender is conservative about adjustments; financial consistency and KPI completeness decide how confidently it can set this number, and a weak read on either axis shaves the baseline before anything else is calculated.
The leverage multiple
Total debt against that baseline. Senior secured unitranche loans in the lower middle market typically support three to four and a half turns of EBITDA, with stronger businesses supporting more, set by the ten-axis read, particularly stress tolerance, customer concentration and KPI completeness, rather than negotiated as a single figure.
FCCR under stress
Fixed-charge coverage recalculated with the EBITDA baseline shaved twenty, thirty or forty percent depending on the lender's credit policy. The covenant package is set to leave headroom in the most likely stress scenarios while still forcing a structured conversation before a covenant breach becomes a default.
The term sheet's shape, the leverage, the covenant package, the amortization, is a structural expression of the credit memo's reading across the ten axes. A borrower who understands the axes can read the term sheet as feedback about where the lender saw weakness, rather than as a negotiating posture.
The findings that quietly tighten the term sheet
A few patterns recur across most credit processes, and all are visible well before a lender sees the file.
- A trailing EBITDA the lender shaves on first read: add-backs it considers aggressive, one-time items that look recurring once several years of history are pulled, or owner-compensation adjustments that do not reconcile to a replacement-cost baseline. The shaved number becomes the baseline for everything downstream, leverage, covenants, debt-service capacity, so a borrower with a well-documented adjustment story protects it and a borrower without one accepts the lender's number instead.
- A close cadence the credit agreement struggles to accommodate: most agreements call for financial delivery within thirty to forty-five days, so a business that closes in sixty or ninety days either gets a structured accommodation with reporting penalties, or commits to tightening the close as a condition of the financing. Either way, the cadence becomes a covenant.
- Customer concentration that fails the stress test: when the top customer is over twenty-five percent of revenue, the lender lowers leverage, tightens covenants, or both, unless the relationship is well documented.
- A working-capital cycle the lender does not want to fund: long cash-conversion cycles, growing receivables aging, or inventory builds that absorb cash are signals the lender treats as direct evidence about credit quality. A pattern consistent with the business's seasonal or growth profile gets funded through a revolver; an inconsistent or worsening pattern narrows the revolver and tightens the borrowing base.
- Operational or legal exposures that surface late: litigation, an environmental matter or an insurance gap found after terms are set tends to reopen the term sheet.
- A customer-concentration trajectory with no documented plan: the lender stresses the case in which the top customer renegotiates or departs, and an undiversified book with no switching-cost evidence absorbs the full stress case rather than a discounted version of it.
None of these findings are exotic, and all of them are visible months or years before a lender opens the file. A borrower who can see the finding coming can choose to remediate it, document around it, or accept the structural term it will produce. A borrower who cannot see it finds out from the term sheet instead.
What this means for a borrower considering a financing
The framework above is not a checklist to perfect before a process. It is a reading map: it names what the credit committee is going to read to, so a borrower can decide which parts of the business to surface, which to remediate, and which to accept will translate into structural terms.
The work is most useful early. Stress-tolerance evidence cannot be produced inside a diligence window. A close-cadence improvement cannot be installed in two months. A customer-concentration trajectory cannot be reshaped in the time it takes to negotiate a term sheet. The framework rewards borrowers who read it twelve to twenty-four months before a financing event, and is far less forgiving of borrowers who read it during one.
Borrowers who already work with a fractional CFO, a debt advisor or an existing banking relationship should run the reading with that advisor, not around them. The work of getting the business lender-ready belongs to the advisor and the operating team; the work of naming the gap against the ten axes is what the reading does.
What a self-assessment produces
A $750 self-assessment is the entry point for running this reading on a borrower's own numbers before a lender does. It produces a structured artifact, not a verbal impression: an operator-attested read, not a document-graded one, so it is a starting calibration rather than a substitute for what a lender's own diligence will eventually require.
- 01An operator-attested intake across the same ten axes a senior credit committee applies, scored with the lender's weighting rather than an equity buyer's.
- 02A structured memo naming which axes are strong, which are weak, and which findings are likely to translate into a tighter covenant, a lower multiple, or both. That naming is what the artifact accomplishes: a borrower-side read in the shape of the lender's own framework.
- 03A working document to run with an existing advisor, a fractional CFO, a debt advisor, or a banking relationship, rather than a replacement for that advisor's own diligence-grade work.
How Capital Refinery reads a borrower's downside case
- Statements and bank data are read on arrival and spread, with revenue, EBITDA, leverage, FCCR and interest coverage traced to the source document where a locator resolves.
- Bank statements are read alongside the financials, and ten advisory reconciliation checks flag internal inconsistencies in the spread without gating it.
- Five house stress scenarios, from a 300bp rate rise to a combined 25% downside, show the modeled first-breach quarter, so the downside case a borrower can see follows the same stress logic a committee applies.
- An EBITDA bridge records each add-back as accepted, rejected or negotiated, so the baseline a borrower defends is the same baseline a lender will shave.
- Compliance certificates are read to their covenant clause as filed, with headroom and drift since approval shown on the same record; where a recompute is supplied, the two are reconciled and any gap is flagged.
A term sheet is not a negotiating posture. It is the output of the ten-axis read, priced.
Questions
What is the difference between how private equity and private credit read a borrower or seller?
A private equity buyer reads the upside case and discounts it; a lender reads the downside case and insists on cushion. The same ten-axis framework applies, but stress tolerance and customer concentration carry more weight for a lender, because the lender does not own the equity upside that would otherwise absorb the risk.
What are the two gating axes in private credit underwriting?
Financial consistency and data integrity. If the trailing numbers do not reconcile, or the inputs cannot be traced to source documents, the credit memo cannot set a baseline the committee trusts, and the deal does not progress until that is resolved.
How much does customer concentration affect a credit term sheet?
When the top customer is over twenty-five percent of revenue, most lenders stress the case in which that customer renegotiates or departs. If fixed-charge coverage fails that stress test, the lender lowers leverage, tightens covenants, or both.
How far in advance should a borrower prepare for a financing?
Twelve to twenty-four months. Stress-tolerance evidence, a faster close cadence and a better-documented customer base all take time to build, and none of them can be produced inside a diligence window.
Does Capital Refinery recompute covenants from the financial statements?
Not on its own. Compliance certificates are read to their covenant clause as the borrower filed them; where a recompute is supplied, the two are reconciled and any gap is flagged. The recompute feed is not yet automated.